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I

humanistic perspective is true. For contemporary
adherents to the perspective that Gantt and Thayne
critique, all scholarship, like all other human
endeavors, has become a zero-sum game—complete
validation or complete repudiation of the “insatiable
self ” (Williams, 1992) and, therefore, of persons who
understand themselves in ways consistent with being
insatiable selves.
I have described elsewhere (Williams, 2015) the
modern self-concept that Gantt and Thayne describe:

n their paper Reflections on Humanistic Psychology,
Ed Gantt and Jeffrey Thayne have accomplished a
number of important things. Various aspects of the
piece, and the arguments Gantt and Thayne make,
have real potential for positive influence on our
understanding of contemporary culture and the selfunderstanding it affords us—nearly always without
our awareness or assent. It certainly stands as an
example of thoughtful and civil discourse in an area
saturated with polarization and politicization. This in
itself is a genuine contribution. I found nothing in it to
give offense, although I would not be shocked to learn
that some will have found fuel for some fire of offense.
It could hardly be otherwise if the very analysis that
Gantt and Thayne make regarding the Rogerian

the term “insatiable self ” . . . describe[s] the selfconcept and self-understanding that have emerged
and taken root in a fairly short span of time, within
a generation [or so]. Such a self-concept arises when
one’s own personal and individual needs, desires, and
23
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claims become the core of one’s self. The pursuit of all
things essential to the self then takes on a species of
primal legitimacy.

coined the term “malaises of modernity” to refer to
this body of understandings of self, culture, and ethics
that have emerged in tandem with, and as context for,
the more specifically psychological self-understanding
inherent in Carl Rogers’s work. As a sample of the
cultural scope of the problem I am referring to here,
I can cite only a few expressions of it. The literature
in this area is very large and rich in both description
and implications. The works dealt with here are some
of the better-known expressions. Charles Taylor
himself cites Allan Bloom’s 1987 book, The Closing of
the American Mind, as a good analysis of the rise of
individualism and moral relativism grounded in the
consummate importance given to every individual’s
own values, in the then rising generation.
In his own influential work on the issue of human
agency, Taylor (1985) described our innate capacity
as human beings to exercise our powers of rationality
in evaluating the elements, or expressions, of our lived
world. He distinguished (see Taylor, 1985, chapter
1), however, between “weak” and “strong” evaluations.
By “weak evaluation,” Taylor meant that we do have
a capacity by our very rational nature to assess, that
is, to attach value and importance to things, actions,
and states of affairs. “Strong evaluation,” on the other
hand is the capacity by which we not only attach
meaning and value to the things of our lives, but by
which we judge some things to be worthy of making,
adopting, or pursuing. This process requires that we
have not only evaluations, but also grounds for those
evaluations and reasons for privileging some over
others as more worthy, or better. Part of the modern
predicament is that, for a host of reasons having to do
with the complex of meanings and understandings
that constitute modern life, including a focus on
individualism, a focus on fulfillment as a good in
itself, and a reluctance to make moral judgments.
For these reasons, among others, we find ourselves
with a significantly diminished ability to make strong
evaluations. This means that we have, in a sense,
lost our way in regard to knowing and choosing
what is true and good, what is to be affirmed and
cherished—thus there is a leveling off of value and
moral worth, and all can easily seem morally relative
and morally indistinct. This same point is at the heart
of a slightly earlier analysis by the sociologist Philip
Rieff (1966/2006). Rieff concentrates on the work of

The analysis of Rogerian theory that Gantt
and Thayne provide illustrates well how small a
step it really is from the proposition that every
person has within a unique nature that strives
toward actualization to the assurance that such
actualization, and thus the development of that inner
nature, is a positive thing and necessary for health
and happiness. The next step is also a small one, to
the realization that such unique actualization and
the happiness it provides constitute an entitlement
for each individual, and the standard by which the
facticity of the world is judged as fair and adequate
on one hand or lacking and unfair on the other. And
finally, that inner happiness and fulfillment become
the standard by which one’s life, one’s actions,
and even other people are to be judged as morally
acceptable or not. This summary is too fast, but it is
adequate for the purposes of this essay, and the fuller
analysis is available from Gantt and Thayne. What
is, perhaps, clearest in all of this is that Rogers’s work
is a cultural biography of the last half of the 20th
century—from a broadly psychological perspective.
It might be debated whether Rogers’s work should
be seen more as creating or merely as reflecting the
spirit of that age. Certainly, a cultural historian could
track the influence of this Rogerian humanism, or,
more accurately, the cultural forces and attitudes
reflected in it, on the generation of baby boomers,
affecting the way they (or, perhaps, many of their
cohort) were reared, parented, and educated, and thus,
how parenting and education have been perceived and
pursued across successive generations. The end of this
extended cultural biography is still being written, and
much social commentary has already been written on
the topic, the body of which cannot be fully catalogued
here. The“attitude” (for want of a better term) informing
our contemporary experience and understanding of
ourselves, our purposes, our sense of morality, our
sense of mortality, and even our aesthetics, which
Gantt and Thayne so well describe, is part of a much
larger set of cultural and psychological realities and
an accompanying largely wariness concerning them,
although the wariness is largely inchoate in the general
population. The philosopher Charles Taylor (1991)
24
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Sigmund Freud as the basis of his critique of modern
psychology and its analysis of the psyche; however,
his analysis is apropos to the Rogerian psyche as well.
He (p. 79) summarizes the predicament brought
about by the self-understanding offered in all species
of modernism as “[the] absurdity of being free to
choose and then having no choice worth making.”
This malaise, identified by Rieff and by Taylor maps
rather neatly onto the Rogerian view of life and world
in which there are few objective standards for judging
value and worth,1 so that one is free to pursue one’s
own sense of value and worth. However, a moment’s
thought is sufficient to notice that if one cannot
make strong evaluations about value and worth in
the external world, one will also lack any grounds for
making strong evaluations about one’s own personal
values—the internal world. Thus a Rogerian psyche
both requires and cannot (with confidence) produce
unconditional positive regard for oneself, nor can one
trust what one might receive from another because
there is no reason to suppose that any other person
has any greater capacity for making strong evaluations
than the person him or herself. There is no rest for the
Rogerian psyche because in the modern world there
is no grounded or sure positive regard. The very term
“unconditional positive regard” requires that there
are no grounding conditions or reasons on which the
positive regard is based (except the mere existence of the
person). It is thus always an evanescent phenomenon.
So, there can be no trustworthy positive regard at all.
This is indeed a haunting proposition.
This metaphor of “haunting” seems to be particularly
apt in any critical analysis of modernity. Life conceived,
understood, and lived under auspices of the modernity
we are discussing here is going to be haunted in some
ways. The price one pays for the kind of strict and
powerful individualism that characterizes modernity
is to be haunted by the void of meaning, value, and

grounding in all aspects of life. This problem has been
noted by thinkers in both the 19th and 20th centuries.
I cite here the work of the Spanish philosopher, Miguel
de Unamuno (1864–1936). In his work, The Tragic
Sense of Life, (de Unamuno, 1913/1954) he raises
the issue of what, in translation, we would refer to as
the “wherefore,” meaning essentially “the purpose” or
“end” of something, including life itself. For him, the
most important question about life is the “wherefore”
question—for what reason or purpose, and toward
what end. A life devoid of a “wherefore” is, for him,
and ultimately for all of us, a frightening proposition.
A Rogerian psyche, as a psyche conceived and lived
in modernity, will be, it seems to me, haunted by the
fact that if there is a “wherefore” to life, it is within the
self, and therefore able to supply only fulfillment of an
otherwise empty self. To apply another metaphor, this
must be like throwing open the blinds to look out the
window in order to see what one anticipates to be a
lovely vista, only to find out that one is looking into a
mirror, every window to the world having been replaced
by a mirror that reflects back only the self.
The fundamental relevance of the question of the
“wherefore” is addressed in a more modern voice by
the contemporary French phenomenologist, Jean-Luc
Marion (2008). It is no coincidence that Marion is a
very good Descartes scholar. It was, after all, the work
of Rene Descartes that began the modern period and
exalted the private mind by making it the instrument
of certainty, and the guarantor, by virtue of its
rational activity, of individual identity and existence.
While Descartes could not have anticipated, much
less intended to produce, the modern individualism,
alienation, and moral relativism that are at the heart
of the malaise of modernism, he nonetheless is rightly
considered to be the father of modernism. The modern
individual ego, with all its powers and problems, is the
finished product of the enlightenment that Cartesian
philosophy made possible. The contemporary
connection between the power of the individual mind
and one’s very being is strong—much stronger for
moderns than Descartes’s simple observation that it
was in thinking that he was assured of his own being.
Marion, in his phenomenological analysis, however,
concludes that the fundamental question at the
foundation of human concern is not the question of
being, but of what we might refer to as “mattering.”

1. There is an irony here in Rogers’s, and the broader
culture’s, position on objective standards of value and conduct.
Certainly, Rogers valued certain things, the worth of individual
persons, autonomy, and freedom for individual persons to selfactualize etc., and he valued them “objectively,” that is across
persons, time, and circumstances. But those very values, for the
most part require the devaluing or at least suspension of most
“objective” values that are taken to be true and valuable across
persons, time and circumstances.
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The assurance we most ardently seek is not captured
by the Cartesian conclusion, cogito ergo sum, but by
the question, a qua bon? This is usually translated as
“what’s the point?” or “what’s the use?,” “What’s the
good?,” or even, closer to de Unamuno’s terminology,
“what for?” This is the question of the modern age,
urgent and persistent even amid all the certainty
provided by the conspicuous achievements of
enlightenment rationality as manifested in its science
and technology.
The question of mattering is an inherently evaluative
concern: it demands judgment that shades into moral
concern. As Marion makes clear, the assurance of
mattering—that I matter—cannot come from myself,
i.e., from the inside. It must come from outside myself,
from another. He reframes the central question, a qua
bon? as “does anyone out there love me?” And assurance
of love cannot come from myself: self-esteem is
ultimately impotent. Marion’s analysis builds on and
extends the work of another French phenomenologist
from the prior generation, Emanuel Levinas (see
1969), capturing the absolutely ethical foundation of
human life as lived and the essential and surpassing
importance of otherness, of both the absolute and
the concrete, individual kind. Thus, the malaise of
modernism that takes the form of individualism and
alienation from the other is significant indeed. It lies
at the heart of our individual and collective identity
and existence.
The 20th-century sociologist, Robert Nisbet (1913–
1996) wrote an important and insightful analysis of
the malaise of alienation. In his introduction to the
1970 edition of his book (Nisbet, 1953/2014), Nisbet
clarifies what he meant by alienation:

allegiance, nor holds sway over his or her aspirations
or actions.
Nisbet (2014, pp. xxiv–xxv), in this same preface,
lays out four species of alienation that characterize
modernism, i.e., our contemporary 20th-century
culture: (a) alienation from the past, which cuts off
“spiritual roots . . . leaving no viable prospect of the
future” (p. xxiv), (b) alienation from physical place
and nature, through mobility and rapidly developing
information technology (pp. xxiv–xxv), (c) alienation
from things, particularly “hard property,” and a shift
to “soft property—shares and equity in something
distant, personally unmanaged, and impersonal”
(p. xxv), and, most importantly, (d) alienation from
community, or the “social bonds which themselves
reach from past to future” (p. xxv). The alienation
described by Nisbet may well be the sickness of
our age and both grounds for, and manifestation of,
the individualism, epistemological relativism, and
anti-foundationalism of our contemporary culture.
Nisbet puts this all in the context of psychology in a
way that makes contact with the work of Carl Rogers
as Gantt and Thayne have explicated it (Nisbet,
1953/2014, p. 55):
Personal crises, underlying emotional dissatisfactions,
individual deviations from strict rectitude—these
have presumably been constant in all ages of history.
Only our own age tends to blow up these tensions
into reasons for a clinical approach to happiness.
Such tensions appear more critical and painful, more
intolerable to contemporary man, simply because the
containing social structures of such tensions have
become less vital to his existence.

Nisbet argues that the of the emaciation of the
structures, functions, and authority of community is
understood in the contemporary mind as the price
that must be paid for freedom—understood, of
course, as a radical sort of individual libertarianism.
There is, however, an interesting paradox to freedom
as conceived by the modern mind. The Italian
philosopher Augusto Del Noce (1910–1989)
studied what we are calling here “modernity” with an
eye especially to the progress of secularism and the
decline of religion in modern Europe with a particular
interest in Marxism as one of the major forces in
this phenomenon. He contends that Marxism has
been the most successful philosophical movement in

the state of mind that can find a social order remote,
incomprehensible, or fraudulent; beyond real hope or
desire; inviting apathy, boredom, or even hostility. The
individual not only does not feel a part of the social
order; he has lost interest in being a part of it. (p. xxiii)

We should note here that the claim is not that the
alienated individual does not want to be part of the
body of persons that make up his or her culture;
sociality is extremely important for reasons that should
be clear—others are needed to provide validation
for the autonomous self. It is that the “social order,”
including institutions, mores, roles, and obligations,
among other things, no longer holds the person’s
26
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the late 19th through the mid to late 20th centuries.
This success is not to be measured by the success of
its political manifestations in the communist nations
of Eastern Europe. Rather its success is found in its
effect on the broader culture and the modern mind
set of our day. (Del Noce, 2014) Del Noce points
out that “Marx’s philosophical position can only be
defined as an effort to think man’s liberation from every
dependence, first of all from God” and that this effort
was “linked completely with a complete negation of the
transcendent and the supernatural” (Del Noce, 2014,
pp. 272–273). There is irony in linking Marxism with
liberation—though that theme has been prominent
in Marxist liberation movements for over a century.
The liberation is not of the political sort, but rather
of the cultural, epistemological, and spiritual sort.
Once liberated from all of the trappings of culture
and tradition, and the “false consciousness” that they
create, people will be more amenable to and more
easily absorbed in the certain and inevitable march of
history that Marxism proclaims to be both true and
real. Meanwhile, however, we are trapped in our own
being, now liberated from religion, transcendence, and
social institutions including the family. We must thus
then rely on our individual selves as the source of all
the stability and meaning from which we have just
been liberated—and thus, the culture of individualism,
relativism, and alienation is reinforced. Charles Taylor
(2007), two decades after his early work on agency
and strong vs. weak evaluations, produced his magnum
opus on the larger topic that I have outlined here—the
“malaises of modernity” (Taylor, 1991). James K. A.
Smith (2014) provides a very insightful and readable
treatment of this phenomenon, and finally, the French
sociologist and anthropologist, Bruno Latour (2013)
offers a compelling analysis of the predicament of
modernity in relation to the issues we have dealt with
from a distinctly postmodern perspective. His section
on “The unerring ways of a generation” (pp. 63–69) is
particularly relevant to the discussion.
The purpose of the preceding was to provide a
broader perspective for Gantt and Thayne’s excellent,
careful, and critical explication of Carl Rogers’s work
and its continuing influence in various forms. They
are correct to conclude that Rogers captured the spirit
of his own age—and ours—and perhaps more than
any other author, popularized an understanding of

ourselves in terms of our modern predicament. He, of
course, was less critical of that understanding and its
origins and consequences than the authors I have cited
here. But he did make an accurate diagnosis of a central
problem of psychological life and function in our age.
It is worth making a historical connection that puts
Rogers’s work and Gantt and Thayne’s analysis into an
even broader historical perspective—the romanticism
of the Renaissance. Much of the tone and thrust of
Rogers’s work can be found in an often-cited passage
from the 15th century philosopher Giovanni Pico
della Mirandola (1463–1494); however, while the
latter is, in this passage, presuming to quote God,
Rogers would likely be disinclined ever to do so.
Thou, constrained by no limits, in accordance with
thine own free will . . . shalt ordain for thyself the limits
of thy nature. We have set thee at the world’s center that
thou mayest from thence more easily observe whatever
is in the world. . . . so that with freedom of choice and
with honor, as though the maker and molder of thyself,
thou mayest fashion thyself in whatever shape thou
shalt prefer.

This classical romantic mindset both influenced
and, ultimately, gave way to the enlightenment
project of bringing everything under the auspices
of the individual rational mind. The question
remains, however: How does this become clinically
relevant? The answer is that culture itself, and the
understanding of self, others, relationships, need,
capacity, and possibility that it affords to us, is
clinically relevant. In other words, Rogers—and a
host of scholars and practitioners since—did not
discover the essence of human ontology, including
pathology and wellness. Rather, he captured the spirit
of the times and told a story of pathology and wellness
deeply imbedded in the cultural affordances of our
time—the late 20th and early 21st centuries. It is the
modern romantic story created against the backdrop
of the triumph of enlightenment thinking and the
“emancipation” it has provided. Philosopher Louis
Dupre (2004) summarized the two-fold triumph of
the enlightenment as, first, complete confidence in the
human mind (even the individual mind) to recognize
and establish truth, and second, the “emancipation”
from needing to believe in anything except what
could be found through the exercise of the mind.
27
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The cultural elite, and, sadly, many in the mainstream
of our culture, are now living out the fruits of this
emancipation. Rogers’s writing reflects the spirit and
essence of this emancipation very well.
However, a stubborn fact of modernity seems to be
that emancipation from all transcendence, structures,
institutions, orders, and truths beyond the contents
and capture of the individual rational mind, along
with the behavioral, emotional, epistemological, and
moral freedom it offers is more attractive and more
fulfilling in the abstract than it is when lived out in
one’s daily life and concrete relationships. Indeed many
thinkers in the 19th and 20th centuries have written
of the predicament of contemporary humankind
as being, in some sense, condemned to freedom. It
is a fearsome thing to be responsible for creating
and maintaining one’s own meanings, morality,
and fulfillment, especially in a world where other
such beings are engaged in the identical project for
themselves. Other people and some stubborn things in
the world seem obstinately disinclined to validate our
personal projects of meaning and satisfaction. Thus
the personal malaise of modernity. On the face of it,
and this essay cannot do other than just describe that
face, it is not clear whether Rogerian-inspired therapy
or the contemporary family of rational/emotive/
cognitive/behavioral therapies (because they embody
and reinforce the malaise of modernism) can actually
alleviate personal manifestations of that same malaise.
The research is apparently clear that such modernist
therapies can be rather successful at reducing distress
and its various manifestations. It makes good sense to
believe that if we are condemned to freedom it is helpful
to be taught how to ameliorate some of the symptoms
of the inevitable existential angst—particularly the
part that may be most obviously irrational. However,
it seems important to ask whether therapeutic
approaches grounded in the assumptions and excesses
of modernity can be expected to address psychological
issues that are grounded in and draw their content
and urgency from, those very assumptions and
excesses. Only if one grants that the malaises of
modernity are inevitable—and “just the way things
are”—should one be inclined to settle for such an
approach that allows one to live more meaningfully in
a meaningless world, or more peacefully in a pointless
culture. It has been my experience that sometimes

students being trained in the psychological helping
professions genuinely wonder just what use to make
of much of their intellectual training and coursework.
The question seems to be, “what is the intellectual
obligation of clinical/counseling professionals, or
clinical/counseling programs?” May I suggest this: If,
as we clearly see from the analysis of Rogerian theory
in the paper by Gantt and Thayne, there is within the
intellectual tradition of our training, an imbedded
malaise of modernity, then we have an obligation
to recognize, identify, and address that malaise. It
is an intellectual problem that is at the root of both
pathology and treatment. It is in our culture. This
seems like a noble intellectual obligation—to address
it, and seek to heal the culture as we help our fellow
beings heal from the culture. If we can help free each
other from the intellectual commitments that have
produced the malaise we will have done, perhaps,
some lasting good.
Modernity, Sexuality and Safe Spaces

Gantt and Thayne choose a powerful, not to
mention controversial, example of an important and
innately meaningful aspect of our humanity as the
topic area within which to illustrate the landscape of
that humanity from a Rogerian and from a Christian
(particularly a Latter-day Saint) perspective.
Sexuality, although controversial, is crucial to the
modernist project. Modernist understandings must
locate all aspects of our humanity within the auspices,
range, and control of the personal ego. The rationality
attributed to the personal ego goes far beyond mere
logic and reason: it extends to evaluations of all sorts,
including moral sensibility, moral judgment, as well
as feelings and passions of all sorts. Sexuality is in a
sense the crown jewel of our modernist humanity,
partly because of its universality—almost everyone
admits it is a very important aspect of his or her life
as a human being. Sexuality also stands out in the
extent to which it engages at once thought, feelings,
emotions, the body, and the mind, as well as other
people. This makes it of great interest to modernist
thinkers seeking to exalt and empower the ego. More
than this, however, sexuality has traditionally been
taken to have a significant biological component. If the
powerful modernist ego, the modernist project seems
to suggest, can wrest sexuality away even from biology
28
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(the body), then the power of the ego is complete. So,
much is at stake in the seemingly benign project of
bestowing on the personal ego (the powerful modern
self ) the power over sexual identity, orientation,
motivation, and so on. We have known this since the
sexual revolution; although its cultural and intellectual
import was not salient in the minds and hearts of most
who participated in it. It has become salient, however,
as our contemporary culture lives out the effects of
the sexual revolution in the context of the malaise of
modernity.
Gantt and Thayne rightly take up the important
issue of what have come to be called in our culture
“safe spaces.” To a great extent, safety of some sort is
at the heart of the Rogerian, modernist project. A safe
space, whatever else it might do, provides the ego a
place to operate, to create life, meaning, and morality
for itself without interference from others or even
otherness—that is, without stifling opposition that
would short circuit the ego’s creative and expressive
acts. Gantt and Thayne rightly acknowledge that the
gospel of Jesus Christ is the ultimate, and perhaps the
only, truly safe space. Latter-day Saints should believe
that a genuinely safe space is available in the restored
church as guided by prophetic authority and the gifts
of the spirit. However, there is also a sense in which
the gospel or church of Jesus Christ is not the sort of
safe space many may be looking for.2
On the one hand, Christianity, by virtue of its
essential message, is everyone’s ultimate “safe space,”
although I prefer the term “safe haven.” Matthew
11:28 invites all to come and promises to give them
rest. Alma 34:16 teaches that the atoning act of Jesus

Christ “can satisfy the demands of justice and encircle
[all who believe] in the arms of safety.” Jesus reminded
the Nephites: “I have commanded that none of you
should go away, but rather have commanded that ye
should come unto me” (3 Nephi 18:25). And finally,
the Savior’s call is to everyone: “has he withheld the
power of the Holy Ghost . . . Or will he, so long as time
shall last, or the earth stand, or there shall be one man
upon the face thereof to be saved?” (Moroni 7:36).
On the other hand, every convicted Christian knows
that salvation is free but it is not cheap. According to
Alma 34:9, “all are fallen and are lost, and must perish
except it be through the atonement.” In Matthew,
Christ teaches, “He that findeth his life shall lose it;
and he that loseth his life for [Christ’s] sake shall
find it.” And “strait is the gate and narrow is the way,
which leadeth unto life,” while “broad is the way that
leadeth to destruction.” (Matthew 7:14, 13) This must
surely seem like the supreme sacrifice to the modern
ego—after all those years of self-creation—to lose
the life and the self one has built. In fact, in the Book
of Mormon we find what seems to be an unqualified
promise to everyone who seeks Jesus Christ. “If men
come unto [Him He] will show unto them their
weakness . . . [His] grace is sufficient for all men that
humble themselves . . . [and He can] make weak things
become strong unto them” (Ether 12:27). It would
be hard to think of a more direct refutation of the
powerful modern ego and the malaise of modernity
that takes the form of self-creation.
Because the project of modern self-construction and
self-maintenance is so compelling, and so complete as
to include and envelope every aspect of the self—from
thought to emotion, to relationships and identity—
and because it is, even in its comprehensiveness,
haunted by specters of nothingness and alienation,
modern egos require not only love and fellowship,
they require validation. Without validation, the ego’s
entire creation is insecure. As I read scriptures, as
most Christians do, Christ validates very few—at
least as we are now, where He finds us or we find
Him. The scriptures are full of accounts, stories, and
parables of people finding Christ, only to have to leave
something of themselves aside or give up something
of themselves in order to really find Him and find
themselves in Him. So, the ultimate safe space is not
a place of validation but of unburdening and rest for

2. Of course, the calling of every Christian is to love all
and do all we can to express that love in words and deeds.
All Christians should hope and strive to provide a spiritfilled place for everyone to rest, feel loved, and unburden.
This is certainly in keeping with what Rogers, and anyone in
the helping professions, would recommend. And we should
acknowledge that sometimes Christians, including Latter-day
Saints, fall short, failing to provide sufficient love, warmth, and
compassion. However, even when genuine warmth and love are
offered and available, there is as a strong strain of the malaise
of modernity that makes a modern self, defined and enformed
by it, resistant even to genuine love. For a self afflicted by the
malaise of modernity, love, without unconditional validation is
not really love. Again, it is the self that judges and insists for
itself what is love and what is not.

29

Volume 38

Issues in Religion and Psychotherapy

the soul, or renovation, and giving ourselves over to
be remade. The contrast with modernity could hardly
be more stark. It is so stark in large part because the
giving over and the remaking go as deep as the very
foundation of our self-constructed modern self. It
penetrates even to what we love. In the same sermon
in which He invites us to lose ourselves, Jesus also tells
those who seek Him, “He that loveth father or mother
more than me is not worthy of me: and he that loveth
son or daughter more than me is not worthy of me.
And he that taketh not his cross and followeth after
me, is not worthy of me.” (Matthew 10:37–38) It does
not take a careful reading to understand that this is not
a statement of Jesus’ callous disregard for family ties. It
is, rather a metaphor, for the depth and power of the
gospel of Jesus Christ to make and remake a soul. Its
power can remake even what we love. We are called to
lay on the alter even what we have come to love, and to
find new love, find Him, and find ourselves in return.
The Lord, we are told, requires the heart and a willing
mind (D&C 64:34) Ironically, and paradoxically, the
ego of modernity both claims absolute control over
what it loves and how it loves, and yet, at the same
time, can make itself helpless in the face of “love”
which “just happens,” or overcomes us. Either way, the
Christian message seems clear: we can change what
we love if we first change whom we love, because He
first loved us (1 John 4:19). It may be here that we find
a foundation for Christian psychotherapy. It may be
here that we find the ultimate safe space.

the 17th century and never resolved, has come down
to us intact, and is now asserted, even with its innate
contradictions, as being essential to our understanding
of ourselves. There is, running through what is this
contemporary makeshift ontology, a particular view of
agency, one understood in strong libertarian terms. It
holds that we have a mind free to choose for itself (and
thus for us) all those aspects of ourselves we may to want
to choose; but we also live in a strongly deterministic
world composed of matter and its various causal
structures that are also operating in us and on us, often
without our awareness, chiefly through things called
“variables” and “structures,” that seem to have power to
cause things within us either with our cooperation or
without it. This is the world as described by modern
scientism (see Hayek, 1952/1979). The fundamental
manifestation of human agency in this intellectual
mélange is autonomous unencumbered free choice –
oddly enough, operating in a being who is both free
to make meanings and choose actions, and at the
same time ultimately powerless to resist or alter brute
physical facticity.
The recommendations for an alternative to a
Rogerian theory of humanity and therapy made by
Gantt and Thayne, and the ideas I have expressed here
are informed by another understanding of human
ontology and human agency. On this view, human
agency is not a mere capacity or a property of our
innate rational powers. It is, rather, incumbent in
the being of humans. To be human is to be a moral
agent. The monumental manifestation of agency thus
conceived is not self-creation and choosing, but the
giving over of oneself—hopefully to truth and good.
Truth and good are not of our own making by the
individual mind; rather, they have their origin in the
world of which we are a part, appropriated in and by
our own actions, as our actions make contact with
and embody what is true. I have elsewhere offered the
beginnings of a formulation of such an understanding
of agency (Williams, 1992, 2002, 2005, in press), and
this essay extends an invitation for further scholarly
investigation. Agency is the key to human ontology
and to human happiness and thriving. This view of
agency requires as a grounding assumption a source of
truth accessible to us. That same source of truth, for
every Christian, invites us into the safe space.

The Neglected Element

Running through the fine essay by Gantt and
Thayne, as well as this brief response, is an ontological
argument—a declaration of what it means to be a
human being, at the most basic and fundamental level.
At the foundation of the malaise of modernism is
an understanding of ourselves uncritically reflecting
intellectual allegiance to a peculiar mixture of
materialist naturalism which brings with it the clear
and present psychic impetus of the brute matter of
which our bodies are composed, combined with a
strong rationality capable of creating for ourselves an
identity, and a version of self and reality which we take
to be true and moral. If this all seems contradictory to
the reader it is because it is contradictory. It seems as if
the fundamental mind-body dualism, descended from
30

“The way of man is not in himself”
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